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- NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
- being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
- The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
- prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
- See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
-
- SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
-
- Syllabus
-
- FORSYTH COUNTY, GEORGIA v. NATIONALIST
- MOVEMENT
- certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
- the eleventh circuit
- No. 91-538. Argued March 31, 1992-Decided June 19, 1992
-
- Petitioner county's Ordinance 34 mandates permits for private demon-
- strations and other uses of public property; declares that the cost of
- protecting participants in such activities exceeds the usual and nor-
- mal cost of law enforcement and should be borne by the participants;
- requires every permit applicant to pay a fee of not more than $1,000;
- and empowers the county administrator to adjust the fee's amount to
- meet the expense incident to the ordinance's administration and to
- the maintenance of public order. After the county attempted to
- impose such a fee for respondent's proposed demonstration in opposi-
- tion to the Martin Luther King, Jr., federal holiday, respondent filed
- this suit, claiming that the ordinance violates the free speech guaran-
- tees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court
- denied relief, ruling that the ordinance was not unconstitutional as
- applied in this case. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that an
- ordinance which charges more than a nominal fee for using public
- forums for public issue speech is facially unconstitutional.
- Held:The ordinance is facially invalid. Pp.6-14.
- (a)In order to regulate competing uses of public forums, govern-
- ment may impose a permit requirement on those wishing to hold a
- march, parade, or rally, if, inter alia, the permit scheme does not
- delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official,
- Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56, and is not based on the
- content of the message, see United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
- 177. Pp.6-7.
- (b)An examination of the county's implementation and authorita-
- tive constructions of the ordinance demonstrates the absence of the
- constitutionally required ``narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite
- standards,'' Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271, to guide the
- county adminstrator's hand when he sets a permit fee. The decision
- how much to charge for police protection or administrative time-or
- even whether to charge at all-is left to the unbridled discretion of
- the administrator, who is not required to rely on objective standards
- or provide any explanation for his decision. Pp.7-10.
- (c)The ordinance is unconstitutionally content-based because it
- requires that the administrator, in order to assess accurately the cost
- of security for parade participants, must examine the content of the
- message conveyed, estimate the public response to that content, and
- judge the number of police necessary to meet that response. Cox v.
- New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, distinguished. Pp.11-13.
- (d)Neither the $1,000 cap on the permit fee, nor even some lower
- ``nominal'' cap, could save the ordinance. Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
- 319 U.S. 105, 116, distinguished. The level of the fee is irrelevant
- in this context, because no limit on the fee's size can remedy the
- ordinance's constitutional infirmities. Pp.13-14.
- 913 F.2d 885 and 934 F.2d 1482, affirmed.
-
- Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens,
- O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed
- a dissenting opinion, in which White, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined.
-